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Eighteenth-century Irish republicanism which culminated in the United Irishmen
has been traced back to some earlierintellectualmovements than the direct
influence of the American and French Revolutions in recent historical
researches. McFarland (1994) underlines the ideological contacts between
Scotland and Northern Ireland and names four factors of radicalism: (1) the
importation of Covenanting tradition to Ulster;(2) the influence of the 'Real
Whigs' in Dublin on the Scottish universities; (3) the 'New Light'
Presbyterianism in Ulster inspired by the Scottish universities;and (4) Francis
Hutcheson (pp. 6-18). Hutcheson may be a synthesis of the firstthree traditions,
which may explain his popularity among the Scottish and Irish literati.
Hutcheson is thus rightly regarded as among the intellectualorigins of Irish
republicanism, but in such recent studies he is mainly represented as a practical
moralist advocating civic virtue.His theory of moral psychology has not been
put in this context yet. We will examine why he took up the idea of a moral
sense in the politicalcontext of Ulster Presbyteriansin the 1720's. In our view
their defence of their conscience in theological terms was developed and
transformed by Hutcheson in his moral philosophy whose essence seems to
have consisted in reconciliation of Protestant private conscience and ancient
communitarianism. A moral faculty discovered in the human senses and
passions provided every citizenwith politicaljudgement which enabled her/him
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to approve the natural rights, including liberty of conscience, and participate in
politics to secure them. This approval of natural equality both in a moral faculty
and rights seems to distinguish Hutcheson's republicanism as remarkably
modern. It is opposed not only to Presbyterian rejection of human nature but
also to civic humanism's limitation of virtue to a few. He gave moral
significance to individuals' happiness in everyday life, putting it before God
and the community.
I Situations of Ulster Presbyterians in the early eighteenth
century
Persistent prejudice derived from the history of the rebellions in the
previous century kept rivalry and hostility between the established Anglican
Church and Presbyterians in Ireland. With the establishment of the Presbyterian
Church in Scotland in the Revolution, the Anglican authority in Ireland was
apprehensive of the growing power of Ulster Presbyterians; the cohesive
organization of the Presbyterian church government seemed more consolidated
by the creation of the General Synod in 1690; and a wave of Scottish
immigration was expanding Presbyterian population.
The Presbyterians enjoyed no statutory toleration until 1719; they could be
persecuted for their worship. Besides they suffered many economic and social
discriminations: with their precarious leases they had to pay high rents and
tithes; the services by Presbyterian ministers in education, marriage and burial
were denied. Anglican ascendency was reinforced by the Test Act of 1704
which barred dissenters from civil and military offices. The Presbyterians'
persistent effort to repeal the act was not successful and the act remained
effective, if not stringently applied, until 1780 (Hayton, 1997, pp. 52-54).
Latimer (1893) observes that 'As a reward for their services, Presbyterians were
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declared incapable of filling the most humble office under that Episcopal
Government for which they preserved Deny to Ireland and Ireland to Great
Britain' (p. 135). The Test Act had considerable effects on the Presbyterian
political interests. According to Hayton (1997)'s close analysis, the test
excluded them from the municipal governments in Belfast and Derry, thereby
reducing their power of returning the Presbyterian candidates to the parliament,
but they maintained their virtual representation through sympathetic Whig
delegates, and in other citiesthe test did not affect their hold in corporations
and parliamentary representation.The main cause for the decreasing number of
dissenting members of the parliament is the decline of the dissenting landed
interests who held closed boroughs and counties (pp. 60, 62, 66, 69, 71). The
Toleration Act of 1719 meant that they were no longer persecuted for their
religious life, but it did not improve their civil rights in substance. Their
complaints about discrimination rather alienated churchmen who suspected their
radicalism in religion and politics.
Besides this issue of the established church and state excluding
Presbyterians, the 1720's presents another issue within the Ulster Presbyterian
church. That is the subscription controversy. When the British government
proposed theIrish Toleration Act of 1719, they required some test of orthodoxy
before granting religious liberty and many Presbyterians thought that the
Westminster Confession of Faith should be the creed to subscribe. The Synod
had required the subscription to it by candidates for the ministry before. But,
though none challenged openly the confession itself,disagreement occured
about the lawfulness of imposing the subscription as a test of orthodoxy. Non-
subscribers called 'New Light' criticizedthe subscription as infringement of
their conscience.
Among them were James Kirkpatrick, John Abernethy, 'the true father of
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the Freethinking School of Irish Presbyterians' (Witherow, 1879, p. 196) and
Samuel Holiday. They were all graduates from Glasgow University, where John
Simson, Professor of Divinity, promoted a progressive outlook of faith,
encouraging free inquiry by observation and reason and in 1715 defended
himself against the authority's charge of teaching heresy (Cameron, 1982, pp.
118f); he denied the Presbytery's right 'to require my [his] private thoughts on
any point of divinity' as against 'the rules of the Gospel, Constitution of this
Church, and the laws of the land, and the rights of every free subject' (Simson,
1727, pp. 13, 15). Stimulated by liberal intellectual climate at the university, the
'New Light' Presbyterians formed the Belfast Society in 1705 for free religious
study and discussion. A non-subscribing minister, James Duchal, remarked in
his A Sermon on an Occasion of the Death of the Late Reverend Mr. John
Abernethy (Dublin, 1741, pp. 49-52): 'no man disputing for victory, but
searching impartially into all that could be said on both sides of a question for
finding the truth' (qtd. in Witherow, 1879, p. 164). Ministers of this society
made another Presbytery in Antrim in 1725, which the Synod refused
communion in 1726. The Presbytery declared in Letter from the Presbytery of
Antrim to the Congregation (1726, pp. 6-10) that 'no Church, or set of
uninspired men, whether met in Synods, Councils, or any other society, have
any power from Christ to add any other terms of religious communion to those
He hath settled in the Gospel' and that setting other terms was 'the setting up in
the church an exorbitant and arbitrary power, contrary to the essential rights of
natural equity, eversive of Christian discipline, a snare to conscience,
destructive of the liberties of Christians, and the holding of an inquisition' (qtd.
in Witherow, 1879, pp. 312f). The Synod had been trying to accommodate non-
subscribers by concession, making the subscription voluntary not compulsory
and allowing candidates for the ministry to state their faith in their own words.
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But schism was not prevented.
We have so far outlined the two issues facing Ulster Presbyterians in the
beginning of the eighteenth century. In view of a distinctly well-organized
institutionof Ulster Presbyterians the firstissue between them and the Anglican
state should not be interpreted as that of tolerationof individual conscience but
as that of politicalstruggle for privileges between Presbyterian and Anglican
communities (Beckett, 1948, pp. 14-17). The second issue of subscription
within the Presbyterians seems more purely concerned with individual freedom.
But in the languages non-subscribers used they mainly took both issues in the
same perspective of toleration.Rather, we should suggest that the issues are in
differentdimensions in that the firstissue of exclusion of Presbyteriansis about
the institutionalframework of a statein juridical terms; while the second issue
of subscription goes beyond such an external institutionto examine humans'
moral faculty and moral improvement. Non-subscribers challenged traditional
Presbyterianism, taking a new rational and moderate approach to religion to
adapt it to modern moral life.Arguments of some of them and Hutcheson are
interesting in that they related these two dimensions of eighteenth-century
politics.We will examine what Hutcheson was doing with his moral philosophy,
putting him in the context of Ulster Presbyterianism. His theory of the moral
sense and passions will be read as a theory of politicaljudgement which would
provide a moral foundation for dissenting politicsin pursuit of liberty of
conscience and civilrights.
II Non-subscribers on liberty of conscience
The subscription controversy can be traced to a new spiritof free inquiry
into theology, which the church authority and the populace suspected as
Arianism and required the test of orthodoxy. According to Westerkamp (1988)
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the general character of the controversy is the challenge of the liberal
progressives to the authoritativeconservatives and such challenge focused on
the opposition of moderate theology stressing reason and virtue to popular
orthodoxy stressingpiety and grace (pp. 101, 103). McBride (1993) also finds
that non-subscribers' insistence on conscience and moral improvement made
them receptive to the language of civic virtue propagated by Hutcheson from
the Molesworth circle (pp. 80-84). This interpretation in terms of civic
humanism, however, seems to be rather procrustean and underplay the
distinctivecontribution of 'New Light' Presbyterianism itselfand the difference
between it and Hutchesonian moral philosophy. The former did not share the
latter's exaltation of a human moral faculty but had a sceptical view of it,
which seems to have underlain theirliberalism defiant of any human authority.
Understanding these points will enable us to make clear how specifically
Hutcheson triedto inherit and modify 'New Light' Presbyterianism.
Instead of imposing the civic humanist paradigm on them, we should first
examine closely what the non-subscribers were saying in their own still
religious terms. Ulster Presbyterians demanded the dissenters' civil rights
against religious discrimination by the established Anglican Church. When non-
subscribers opposed their private persuasion to their own church authority,they
were aware of the connection of their liberty of conscience and the whole
dissenters' cause of toleration.In logical sequence the dissenters'civil rights
presuppose the liberty of non-subscribers' conscience. Then making conscience
independent of authority will naturally lead to considering a human faculty of
moral judgement; in this appreciation of a moral faculty non-subscribers and
Hutcheson seem to differ.Furthermore non-subscribers' liberal theology and
politicspresupposed and was motivated by their moral orientation,which needs
examining in order to understand where they should be located in the shiftfrom
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Augustinian Presbyterianism to polite moral philosophy.
So in this chapter we will take up three major non-subscribers and first
examine their criticisms of institutionsexcluding them in pursuit of liberty of
conscience, then proceed to their view of a moral faculty,and thirdlyinfer their
moral orientation behind their liberal politicsand theology. Here we owe the
idea of moral orientation to Charles Taylor (1994), who elucidates modern
internalizationof moral sources by finding that deism replaced the hierarchical
order of reason with the providential design of nature which enabled us to
affirm our sentiments and ordinary life as morally significant(Part III). The
'New Light' Presbyterians can be put in this process of internalization.We will
see specificallytheir distinctivemoral vision of what humans should be in the
divine government.
James Kirkpatrick (1731) opposed any church authority which imposed
new religiouslaws, such as the Westminster Confession; a church's discipline,
truth,peace and order may be maintained without the authority which seemed
to him 'the bane of allpeace and unity in the Christian church' (p. 83). A main
reason for non-subscription is derived from the Protestant principle:the Bible is
the rule and Christ is the law-giver. So non-subscribing Presbyterians can claim
to theirloyalty to the Protestant tradition.Moreover he thought non-subscription
was connected with the cause of the whole dissenters against the Anglican
confessionaliststate.He observed that subscribers who supported the Synod's
power to impose new laws could not deny the same power to the Anglican
Church (p. 93).
His liberal confidence is based on his faithin 'the rights of conscience and
privatejudgment' (p. 26). He explained that God gave each human the faculty
of recognizing religious rules and comparing her/his actions with them. On this
judgement he builtindividuals' self-government defiant of any authority,which
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seems essential to republicanism. He observed that 'all Christians have a right
to try the decisions of popes, prelates, councils and synod, presbyteries and all
other assemblies, and to judge for themselves, whether they be true or false,
right or wrong, and to cleave religiously to truth and duty, in opposition to
them all'(p. 27).
So can we find moral sources fully subjectivised in him? We want to take
up two issues to modify such a view. First it is still God positively as well as
ultimately that enables individual judgement to reject any mediate authority and
this poses problems. True, 'the word of God is the only rule' (p. 74), but how
can one be sure that she/he is following it in judging for herself/himself? In fact
Kirkpatrick used a sceptical argument about human judgement to say that 'creed-
makers are fallible men': 'And if every set of rules have a power of imposing
what appears to them to be true and agreeable to Scripture; it is impossible this
power should not be abus'd, and turn'd in many instances against truth. All
men are fond of their own opinions; they all seem to them, to be just and true;
and, if they believe that the imposing of truth is doing real service to it,it will
be unavoidable, in this state of imperfection, that error shou'd be impos'd, and
worthy good men censur'd for not embracing it' (p. 77). So nobody can or
should be so positively sure of her/his conscience as to impose it on others.
This is paradoxically a reason for defending conscience against authority.
Christian denunciation of a human natural faculty as opposed to the divine
grace is the basis of the right of conscience. Scepticism of human judgement
may partly cause non-subscribers' elitist dismissal of congregations who
pretended to examine the faith of candidates for the ministery. Though their
liberal religion seems to have affinity with republicanism, this negative view of
human judgement does not suggest how one's conscience work on others' for
political action instead of remaining within itself.
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Secondly in Kirkpatrick's outlook private conscience did not monopolize
moral resources. It was contained within the private field, separated from civil
authority. This is a corollary from separation of religion and politics. He
admitted that the public authority was the judge of the public good with no
positive civil role for private judgement:
The proper sphere, then, of civil authority do's not coincide nor interfere
with the sphere of conscience. For conscience judges only of our actions as
they are religious, or irreligious: And civil authority has nothing to do with
them, under that consideration; and, therefore, enforces all its laws by the
power of the sword, and by temporal rewards and punishments; which
ought, by no means, to be used in the business of religion, (p. 36)
Conscience thus explicitly did not form independent political judgement;
rather it was supposed to conform to the civil authority. But in fact the Irish
state was far from civil enough because it was still a confessional state
integrated with the Anglican Church, so no such separation was realized on the
establishment side. In dissenters' strategy for winning full toleration, adopting
this Lockean separation, which was a formal ideology of the revolution
settlement, meant making dissenters innocuous enough to appeal to the
establishment. When a High Church, William Tisdal, denounced Presbyterians
as offspring of regicides and confusing the revolution and the rebellion,
Kirkpatrick defended their allegiance to the crown and Whig constitutionalism
in his historical work (1713): 'tho' they are religious dissenters, they are
political conformists' (p. 451).
For all these difficulties, some words in his works seem suggestive of a
general tendency of his moral orientation. He mentioned that, while laws and
creeds by human authority were disruptive of church, the peace would be
realized when the pure religion consisted of moral sentiments, emphasizing 'an
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unity of heart and affection' and 'all the offices of humanity and charity' (pp.
85f.)- So he looked at some virtuous and civilized society ahead of liberation of
conscience. It is true that these remarks were not fully developed into a system
and that in his outlook the divine order was not extended to human nature. But
we can infer from his vision an appreciation of self as the moral standard,
though derivative, and the significance of moral improvement of self. Moral
realism is shown in his opposition to human voluntarism of subscribers who
'claim such an extravagant power to their judicatories, as by their sole authority
to alter the very morality of actions, and by their command to make an action
innocent, which antecedent to their command was sinful' (p. 45).
Abernethy (1733) demanded the repeal of the sacramental test by referring
to the theory of the social contract: humans enter civil society for the purpose
of securing liberty essential for their reasonable enjoyment and happiness, so
any limitation of some subjects' liberty presupposes that their liberty is
incompatible with 'the true original interests and liberty of the civil community'
(p. 29). But this was not the case for the dissenters who acknowledged the civil
constitution. The sacramental test was clearly an infringement of their civil
liberty. He criticized the conformity enforced by laws as popish persecution
contrary to the Whig revolutionary principle: 'every attempt towards such an
extensive uniformity in religious modes and opinions, when attended with
penalties' is 'a plain violation of the original contract, a branch of that tyranny
which extends itself even to the soul' (p. 33).
It seems that for Abernethy the principle of the formation both of a church
and of a state is personal commitment. He underlined this when he remarked
that 'civil societies are, or ought to have been, voluntary associations' (p. 39).
So the dissenting idea of religious conscience is also the foundation of their
politics: conscience is constitutive of civil society. And in turn the social
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contract and the resultant civil society are designed to overcome religious
discrimination and defend their conscience by separating reasonable human
needs as natural rights from religious consideration. The social contract is
precedent to religionin that the end of civil government is 'the common safety
and happiness of those, who are united under it,considered only as rationaland
social creatures in this world' (p. 94). We might say that the social contract
theory provided an effective procedure for the dissenters to get out of the
confessional state and envisage a secular statein which the natural needs of
humans, regardless of theirdenominations, would be provided for.
The repeal of the test would naturally promote the dissenters'interests,but
at the same time Abernethy also put it into a wider perspective of 'the British
and Protestant interest in Ireland' (p. 59). He tried to appeal to the
establishment by remarking that the repeal was thus necessary from the strategic
viewpoint of the Protestant establishment, though the authority knew well that
the Presbyterians would be ready to ally with the Anglicans against the
Catholics even without such a concession (Beckett, 1948, p. 18).
That such a general union should survive schismatic sectarianism was
Abernethy's policy when he joined the subscription controversy. So he (1722)
supported the Synod's conciliatory policy to the non-subscribers. The Synod
allowed intrants either to subscribe or explain their confession in their own
words to be accepted as ministers by congregations. Abernethy triedto shift the
point by reminding that what mattered was 'not the question between the
subscribers and non-subscribers, but this whether notwithstanding that
difference a perfect union ought to remain among the Presbyterians in the
north' (p. 53). His argument may have been persuasive to some degree because,
as he said, the internal union was a base of their reputation as a great part of
'the Protestant and British interest of this kingdom' (p. 3). Here we should
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notice that this specific strategy was still a far cry from the later United
Irishmen with its pro-Catholic and Irish nationalist orientation.
Apart from such a specific difference, however, Abernethy suggested how
different sects should promote general union among them, which would be
relevant to the United Irishmen's programme. He emphasized subscribers' and
non-subscribers' agreement in a few basic Christian doctrines which his true
religion consisted of, and he relegated their controversy about subscription to
that only in expediency. For him the agreement in the first point was
compatible with the disagreement in the second point. A subscription to a man-
made confession of faith should not be regarded as the essential condition for
church membership; such prescription would disrupt the union. His guiding
principle was 'no human power ought to make anything necessary to Christians,
as a term of communion which Christ has not made necessary' (p. 46). With
this principle the union would be compatible with differing judgements.
In ecclesiastical and civil politics we have seen Abernethy's radical idea of
personal commitment, which surely shows internalization of moral sources.
When moral sources are put in individual conscience, it will become morally
significant to study and improve a moral faculty of judgement. For Abernethy
(1720) it was natural that 'religious obedience is founded on personal
persuasion' (p. 222). Human authority in church and government cannot bind
conscience which is subject only to the authority of God. This freedom must be
absolute because 'how is it possible that one man should determine for another,
how far this judgement shall extend, and to what instances? To limit and
prescribe to it,is, in effect, to deny it altogether' (p. 241). It is also conscience
that sets a contract between magistrates and subjects. Thus conscience or
personal persuasion plays key roles, and Abernethy identified it with 'the
common sense of mankind' (p. 248) and opposed it to authority. But, as he
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mentioned, judgement is not free from problems of prejudice, interests and
passions, and a vain unguided imagination. He gave procedural advice to ensure
the right use of judgement: he stressed evidence, attentive reasoning, and
deliberation(224). This move to empirical moral philosophy in his argument on
conscience is interesting, yet it is not fully developed. His account of
conscience was rather focused on its relations with God in theological terms
and he did not develop empirical argument by examining how judgement works
in actual human psychology in society. Despite conscience's key roles, his
internalizationof moral sources was not completed; independent authority was
located in conscience but its substantialjustness was not explained internally
with principles of human mind. He had to rely on the ontology of 'the
invariable reason and nature of things'(p. 223) to justifyconscience.
Though lacking an empirical analysis for proving a human moral faculty,
Abernethy's stresson personal persuasion makes clear the moral orientationof
his religion.Instead of contrasting the divine grace with helpless human nature,
his religion implies human moral possibilityof reason and virtue.In fact he
remarked that the true design of Christianitywas 'toimprove the human nature
in moral goodness, to reclaim men from their corrupt dispositions and vicious
habits, and make them as like God in all his imitable perfections as it is
possible for such creatures to be' (1735, p. 260). We may reasonably find the
influence of Hutchesonian moral philosophy in this clear statement which was
made in 1735 afterHutcheson's main works were published.
Samuel Haliday (1724) explained his reason for non-subscription: 'my
scruples are, concerning the lawfulness of submitting to human testsof divine
truths,especially in a great number of extraessentialpoints, when imposed as
necessary terms of Christian, or ministerialcommunion' (p. 1). Christ was the
sole authority for him and the church authority should not add any test for
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communion which Christ did not prescribe. Conformity was opposed to variety
of individual opinions each of which should be toleratedin benevolent spirit
because it was beyond mortals to reach the truth and agree anonimously; 'an
exact agreement of opinions, if men are sincerein their searches after truth,can
never take place' (p. 53). Liberty of conscience is thus based on his
understanding of the perennial imperfection of human understanding; sincerity,
not truth,is what humans are obliged to aim at. Here moral sources are
extremely subjectivizedinto each personal persuasion. In contrast to the divine
will, each particular human will is moral good to which one should commit
oneself. We may regard it as the basic pattern of his moral vision that
multiplicityof particular goods is opposed to uniformity of the good of the
whole system.
In spite of civilsociety's right to impose itslaws made by the majority of
representatives,Haliday argued that in matters of conscience representation and
majority rule did not work (p. 101). So like the above two theologians he
combined politicalconformity with religious dissent. This moderate argument
for minority's toleration was applicable to both non-subscribers and dissenters
in general. Limiting his radicalliberty of conscience to the religious sphere, he
apparently tried to convince the establishment of the dissenters'loyalty to the
constitution.Schismatic controversy should not impede conciliatoryunion in his
Protestant strategy. When the toleration act of 1719 permitted the dissenting
institutionsand worship, he argued, 'the British and Protestantinterestin this
kingdom' (p. 151) had priorityover the internal tension. While 'New Light'
theologians were disputatious,we can find in them polite,not zealous, values
enabling them to take an extensive perspective of civil as well as religious
goods.
Haliday was sceptical of human understanding reaching the absolute truth.
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The subscription controversy may be interpreted as focusing on the problem of
partial opinions. In non-subscribers' view human laws by church authority
which is never free from partialpassions and interestsmake the problem worse.
Human testslead to 'superstition,idolatry and spiritualtyranny' (p. Ill) and
confusing errors.Furthermore the imposition of unity causes secessions because
humans are fallible,'proud, passionate, selfish,fond of their own opinions and
impatient of contradiction'(p. 114). So the possible solution would be that each
conscience should judge according to the divine laws. Haliday contrasted the
humanity and the divinity in search for the universal moral standard above
partialityof opinion. He knew that 'publick authorized human standards of
orthodoxy' (p. 109) were affected by partiality.So Christ'srevelation recorded
in the Scripture is 'the only proper test and standard of orthodoxy' which the
unlearned as well as the learned can understand for their salvation (p. 110).
Thus 'the native purity and simplicity of the Christian religion'(p. 112) was the
way out of the confusing world of partial opinions. In non-subscribers'
argument moral sources were surely moved into each conscience, yet
conscience depended directly on God for its moral standard, and some
transcendental appeal to God was indispensable; human nature was not morally
autonomous. Any independent moral faculty in human psychology was not
demonstrated nor was any articulatevision of moral improvement shown within
civilsociety.
Ill Hutcheson on the moral sense and the natural rights
How can our undrestanding of the problem situations of Ulster
Presbyterians help to interpret Hutcheson's moral philosophy? There are two
contradictoryinterpretationsof his philosophy now. Moore (1991) distinguishes
his two incompatible systems; in early years in Dublin he expounded moral
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realism as a serious technical pursuit but later in Glasgow University he
lectured natural jurisprudence as a conventional subject for young students.
Haakonssen (1991) tries to synthesize his moral realism and natural
jurisprudence. In our limited study we only consider his philosophy as far as it
is related to contemporary Ulster Presbyterianism. With its situations for a
context of his philosophy, we may find a reason why he took up both the moral
sense and the natural law and suggest an account of how the two systems were
connected in his practical intention.
Returning from Glasgow to Ireland in 1718 Hutcheson was surprised at
'New Light' zeal and found their zeal rather misdirected:
I find by the conversation I have had with some ministers and comrades,
that there is a perfect Hoadly mania among our younger ministers in the
north; and what is really ridiculous, it does not serve them to be of his
principles, but the pulpits are ringing with them, as if their hearers were all
absolute princes going to impose tests and confessions in their several
territories,and not a set of people entirely excluded from the smallest hand
in the government anywhere, and utterly incapable of bearing any other
part in persecution but as sufferers. I have reason, however, to apprehend
that the antipathy to confessions is upon some other grounds than a new
spirit of charity, (qtd. in Reid, 1867, III, 115f)
The reference to Hoadly connects non-subscribers' defence of private
conscience with Anglican latitudinarian attack on church authority. This letter
suggests Hutcheson's detached opinion that rather than in a sectarian interest
non-subscribers should be more interested in actual sufferings of the
Presbyterian community as a whole excluded by the Anglican establishment.
But they surely shared the intellectual and moral approach to religion. In fact it
is said that his sermon exalting virtue and moral improvement astounded some
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naive orthodox congregation in Ulster. A parishioner said to his father:
Your silly son, Frank, has fashed a' the congregation with his idle cackle,
for he has been babbling' this 'our about a good and benevolent God and
that the souls of the heathen themselves will gang tae heaven if they
follow the licht o' their aen consciences. Not a word does the daft boy ken,
spur, nor say about the gude auld comfortable doctrine of election,
reprobation, original sin, and faith, (qtd. in Westerkamp, 1988, p. 103)
Thus both Hutcheson and non-subscribers were promoting a new liberal
theology. But we notice a clear difference between them in the fact that, while
the latter mainly remained in theology, the former developed moral philosophy
from a theological basis. The limitations which we have identified in the non-
subscribers' theology will help to understand what made Hutcheson proceed to
the morals. When non-subscribers defended their conscience against the church
authority to impose a new creed, they failed to justify a human moral faculty
because of their belief in the depravity of human nature. So they had recourse
to the divine will for the moral standard. The divine will and decrees were
absolute for them and in this sense they adhered to moral voluntarism. Though
their praise of conscience points to moral internalization, the deity, to which
conscience was subject, held moral sources. Hutcheson's natural theology and
moral psychology broke through this limitation to moral internalization to a
greater degree. He developed Shaftesburian deism which internalized 'a
teleological ethic of nature' into moral sentiments (Taylor, 1994, p. 255).
Assuming natural sociability he extended the providential moral order into
human nature, that is, the senses and passions so that moral sources were
subjectivized into sentiments. The purpose of his moral philosophy was to find
'natural connexion or order' in the 'multiplicity of natural desires' (1747, p. 39).
All passions, including selfish, were linked to the public good within the divine
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harmony, as he remarked: 'how admirably our affections are contrived for good
in the whole....by them each particular agent is made, in a great measure,
subsurvient to the good of the whole. Mankind are thus insensibly link'd
together,and make one great system, by an invisible union' (1728, pp. 177f).
Hutcheson discovered the moral sense on the assumption of the divine
order in human nature. This epistemology of virtue was owed to Shaftesbury
and the ancient moral philosophy, but in the context of Ulster Presbyterianism
his theory of the moral sense just provided the human moral facultyin which
the non-subscribers' defence of conscience was deficient.Against Augustinism
underlying both traditionalPresbyterianism and Hobbesian and Pufendorfian
natural jurisprudence he illustratedthe moral sense and furthermore classified
passions into the public as well as the selfishto prove natural benevolence. His
seemingly facile optimism did not prevent him from noticing the possible
partialityof the moral sense. With dissenting background he knew well that
many human disasters,such as religious persecutions, were due to 'a sense of
virtue upon false opinions, and mistaken benevolence' and 'wrong or partial
views of publick good' (1725, p. 189). Then Hutcheson introduced the
distinction of 'particularpassions' and 'general calm desires' which allows
reason to consider the effects and circumstances of actions and suspend them
(1728, pp. 29f). Reason overcomes 'partialview of publick good' to apprehend
'extensive impartial schemes of publick happiness' (1728, p. 97). Through
discipline and education natural affection can be improved into the universal
impartial benevolence. With this moral judgement established in individuals we
have reached an important point of internalizationof the moral standard.
But the role of Hutcheson's moral epistemology was not just to provide
internaljustificationof conscience with judgement of the general good. His ap-
preciation of the moral sense and natural affection seems to offer a new
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vindication of the moral significanceof particulargoods which the moral sense
approves and which tend to be sacrificedfor the universal standard by God with
the absolute authority. Non-subscribers had God-centred values in that they
regarded as imperfectness the variety of human individualitieswhich must be
subjected to the universalityof God. So Hutcheson's recognition of the moral
significance of particular,even if partial,affections and actions may be a
transformation of values. He reduced thelove of God to an additional motive to
virtue,remarking that 'when a person therefore not thinking at present of the
deity, or of a community or system, does a beneficient action from particular
love, he evidences goodness of temper' (1728, p. 327). His following explicit
statement makes it clear that God was becoming morally less relevant:
however we must look upon that temper as exceedingly imperfect,
inconsistent,and partial,in which gratitude toward the universal benefactor,
admiration and love of the supreme original beauty, perfection and
goodness, are not the strongest and most prevalent affections;yet particular
actions may be innocent, nay virtuous.(1728, p. 333)
Compared with that of non-subscribers Hutcheson's moral vision does not
seem to consistin rising up to some transcendental divine order but in private
everyday life with particular affections for family and friends as well as in
moral improvement to the perfect civic virtue. While the former is accessible
only to intellectualelites,the latteris open to common people. Hutcheson's
moral sense is conducing to the natural equality of humans as it makes morals
possible to everyone. He was dissatisfiedwith Augustinian theology underlying
naturaljurisprudence for this reason:
If to make a mind virtuous; or even innocent, it be necessary that it should
have such sublime speculations of God,...then God has placed the bulk of
mankind in an absoluteincapacity of virtue,and inclined them perpetually
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to infinite evil, by their very instincts and natural affections. (1728, p. 331)
Hutcheson's moral vindication of the human passions led to rehabilitation
of bodily desires which had been despised in contrast with spirit in Christianity.
Hence 'the affirmation of ordinary life' (Taylor, 1994, p. 211) with its centre in
economic improvement rather than in the salvation by the divine grace. Such
life is based on the system of natural laws and rights, which Hutcheson claimed
to deduce from the moral sense and which it seems to have been the primary
purpose of government to defend in his politics of the popular consent. Let us
see how his moral epistemology brought his theory of natural rights and laws,
and then how his moral epistemology secured the people's political judgement
for their political participation to defend the rights. In short, unlike the non-
subscribing Presbyterians, his moral sense theory enabled him to develop his
theology into moral philosophy, in a wider sense, with a perspective of modern
society.
It is clear that even in his early ethical works Hutcheson intended his
moral sense theory to be relevant to natural jurisprudence and politics. He
wanted his discovery of the moral sense and natural sociability to reduce the
absolutist implication of Augustinian self-love theory underlying Pufendorfian
natural jurisprudence. The providential order demands, observed Hutcheson, that
the opposition between grace and nature and that of the natural law and human
nature should be dissolved:
...asif each person were in his whole frame only a separate system from
his fellows, so that there was nothing in his constitution leading him to a
publick interest, further than he apprehended it subservient to his own
private interest; ...the wisdom and goodness of the author of our nature is
traduced, as if he had given us the strongest dispositions toward what he
had in his laws prohibited; and directed us, by the frame of our nature, to
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the meanest and most contemptible pursuits; as if what all good men have
represented as the excellence of our nature, were a force or constraintput
upon it by art or authority.(1728, pp. 67f.)
So in the subjectivizationof the naturallaw by the moral sense Hutcheson
wanted to make humans moral agents who would respect natural laws. He
simply claimed to deduce natural rights from the moral sense, statingthat 'by
our natural sense of right and wrong, and our sympathy with others, we
immediately approve any persons procuring to himself or his friends any
advantages which are not hurtful to others, without any thought either about a
law or the general interest of all'(1747, p. 120). Particularprivate goods are
thus approved by the moral sense as natural rights prior to the general good.
This must be an essentialcontributionto modern liberalism, considering the fact
that the concept of the general good tended to be used to justifyabsolutism.
But, as we have seen in his ethics,the moral sense and sympathy are not
free from partialityso they may fail to perceive the general good of the whole
system and put particular goods into perspective when natural rights must be
justifiedin relationto the general good. For example important and reasonable
needs of some people distant from us may not be admitted as natural rights
because needs of others near us preoccupy our moral sense. We have seen that
Hutcheson introduced the concept of 'the general calm desires'to allow reason
to judge in terms of the general good. These 'general calm desires'seem to be
a second psychological basis for the naturalrights because they prove consistent
with a detached rational judgement of the general good. Here Hutcheson
somehow put the naturalrights on sentiments, yet he was not quite consistentin
his subjectivization of the natural laws when he introduced reason for the
general perspective.Such perspective required civic disciplinewhich was rather
elitist;so not quite consistent with his intention of making virtue open to all.
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With such difficultiesHutcheson set the natural rights on the basis of
moral facultiesof the moral sense and reason. This is the subjective approach to
natural rights in terms of epistemology. But Hutcheson seems to have another
approach in terms of the external moral order. If reason is not available, the
divine harmonious order may ensure that such subjective needs as the moral
sense approves will be admitted as natural rights consistent with the general
good. In this sense the natural theology provided the ontological framework of
the whole system in which to consider natural rights.But he tired to prove even
God's right to moral government by applying his method of the moral sense
and reason. His right is approved because of His justice, 'universalimpartial
benevolence' to his whole creatures(1725, p. 272). Hutcheson is a moral realist,
thinking that the public good, not the divine will, makes us obliged to His
naturallaws.
In Hutcheson's account each individual with moral judgement is herself/
himself a founder, so jealous of, the natural rights and laws. This legal
framework had a moral vision; not some transcendental one, but of everyday
life.Private happiness and economic improvement had important places in such
a vision. So it was to the purpose that he explicated laws on family, contracts,
and property in his moral philosophy to prepare students for their future
business and civic life. He defended private property as the indispensable
institutionfor encouraging industry when most humans were usually motivated
farless by 'the general affection to his kind' than by 'the narrower affections'
and 'the selfish ones', criticizingUtopian visions like Plato's and More's
communism as destructive of liberty and impracticable because the right
distributionby magistrates could not be trusted.His natural theology underlay
his opposition to the Utopian community when he remarked about Plato that 'it
seems too arrogant in that fine genius to attempt an overturning the manifest
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constitution of the Creator, and to root out what is so deeply fixed in the human
soul; vainly presuming to contrive something better than the God of nature has
ordered' (1755, I, 320-324). In this criticism Hutcheson is appealing to the
Protestant gap between God and humans which set a limit to what politics is
able to do; unlike God philosopher kings should not make humans and society
by their blueprint as if in arts.
IV Hutcheson on politics of popular consent and eschatology
While the divine will and the polis provided the absolute moral standard
for non-subscribing Presbyterians and ancient citizens respectively, Hutcheson
internalized the moral standard in each moral sense's approval so that he no
longer assumed the moral stability: for all his apparent exaltation of the moral
sense and civic virtue, he realized moral limitation inevitably attached to
subjectivization: 'it is so hard to judge of the moral goodness of others, and
men are so frequently led by prejudice and party-zeal into the most
unfavourable opinions of the best of men' (1755, II, 17). Though we find two
opposing ancient and modern views coexisting in his text on justice (1755, I,
260f) and liberty (1755, II, 282), that is, one aimed for the noble virtue; and the
other for the defence of rights from power, we should interpret that the latter is
viable and appropriate to his moral subjectivism. His remarks on modern liberty
runs: 'In our modern plans of laws, where little regard is had to the education
and discipline of the subjects, their natural liberty is littleconfined in any sense;
and a people is denominated free, when their important interests are well
secured against any rapacious or capricious wills of those in power' (1755, II,
282).
His vision of modern polity may seem to minimize politics. In fact his
friend of similar intellectual background and tendency, James Arbuckle, as an
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editor of the Dublin Journal, stated that he would avoid any politicaltopics
because it was not time to examine 'the principles of Leviathan, or an Oceana'
and denied that 'everybody should be made acquainted with the foundations and
original of government' if he is to serve the public. He was an Addisonian
journalist stressing the reform of manners (No. 1). Though Hutcheson also
acknowledged 'courtesy and good-manners' as 'the natural dress of virtue,the
indications of those affectionswhich are truly honourable and lovely' (1755, II,
112), he had no intention whatever to reduce the importance of politicsin his
moral philosophy. Rather we will suggest that his moral sense theory provided
the people with politicaljudgement necessary for theirparticipationin politics.
The subjectivizationof moral sources means that everyone can judge his
natural rights by his moral sense. The moral sense seems to be a moral
foundation of the people's political activity,enabling every citizen to judge
whether the government fulfilsits purpose of preserving his rights.For all his
admiration of ancient civic virtue, his moral theory centred on epistemology
implies that the legitimation of political power no longer consisted in the
superior virtue of the legislatorsbut in the consent of the people. As Hutcheson
often tends to be interpreted as a civic humanist, this modification needs
stressing.Virtue is now examined from the spectatorialperspective of whether
the people approves or disapprove of it. This spectatorialview probably had
much to do with Hutcheson's moral vision of human happiness derived from
ordinary private life. Government is constructed primarily to secure such
happiness and politicsis concerned mainly with restrictionof the abuse of
power.
Hutcheson's outlook of limited politicsis related with limitation of a
human moral faculty.Here he was true to the Presbyterian traditionalscepticism
of a human moral faculty which we saw in non-subscribers. If we were
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absolutely sure of someone's virtue, he would have a perfect right to dispose of
our rights. But, as it is,
there is no acknowledg'd standard, or judge of superior wisdom or
benevolence, which every one would be too apt to claim... And as each
man is more nearly engag'd for his own good by self-love, than another is
by mere benevolence, he will scarcely be brought to believe, that another
understands his interest, or pursues it, better than he could himself. And
what happiness can remain to the govera'd, while there is any suspicion of
either the benevolence or wisdom of the governor? Especially when there
are too great presumptions, that governors may be sway'd by self-love
against the publick good. (1725, p. 271)
Thus Hutcheson's moral sense theory leads to scepticism of political
power; his insistence on natural benevolence never supports credulity. And
follows the conclusion:
From this consideration, as well as the natural love of liberty, and
inclination both to act and judge for our selves, we justly conclude, 'that
except when men, for their own interest, or out of publick love, have by
consent subjected their actions, or their goods within certain limits to the
pleasure of others; no mortal can have a right from his superior wisdom, or
goodness, or any other quality, to give laws to others without their consent,
express or tacit; or to dispose of the fruits of their labours, or of any other
right whatsoever. (1725, pp. 271f)
The foundation of political power is not some presumption of virtue or
moral excellence in a ruler but popular consent. It may be said that Hutcheson's
moral epistemology introduced the common people's viewpoint by examining
how affections and activities are approved or disapproved and defined humans'
judgement and its limitation. The moral faculty makes it possible for the people
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to be independent agents whose consent only legitimates politicalpower. And
the limitation of the faculty will make it necessary for the people to be always
jealous of their rights against the abuse of power because they can never be
sure of magistrates'probity which they might expect in Plato's Republic. So we
think that his moral sense theory provides a moral basis for his social contract
theory including the right of resistance.
Hutcheson's stress on the people's consent in contrast to virtue or moral
excellence in politicsreminds us of the spiritualimportance which he attached
to the natural rights and liberty.His argument is clearlymotivated by Protestant
moral orientation to internalization.Noticeably he found 'the right of natural
liberty' suggested not only by self-interestbut 'by our moral sense, which
represents our own voluntary actions as the grand dignity and perfection of our
nature' (1755, I, 295). The right of private judgement is the most morally
significant of natural rights. He especially remarks, 'As to opinions about the
deity, religion, and virtue, this right is further confirmed by all the noblest
desires of the soul' (1755, I, 295f). Private sinceritywas morally uppermost for
him, so he demanded toleration and refuted any imposition of even the true
religion. Though he encouraged the state to inspire virtue and religion in the
people, he limited its action only to rationalpersuasion (1747, p. 318; 1755, II,
31 Of), and he was optimistic that free speech would resultin the moral and
intellectualimprovement:
It has always been found, where there have been no restraintsupon men
about such tenets,in free states,and where there has been a general
tolerationof them with good nature; free conversation and argument have
gradually abated the bigotry and hot zeal of weak men about such points,
and made more just sentiments of religiongenerally prevail.(1755, II, 313)
The contrast of the divine and the human governments based respectively
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on moral excellence and popular consent shows that Hutcheson shared dualism
with Presbyterian theologians. He was surely a Christian moralist; that his
ethics could not do without God is shown by the fact that he excluded atheism
from toleration as 'denial of a moral providence, or of the obligation of the
moral or social virtues'(1755, II, 313). His critiqueof atheism makes clear that
he considered religionin terms of its effect on social morality and politics.But
on the other hand he had an ultimate religious vision in which the worldly
values had relatively smaller significance. Throughout 'An enquiry into the
supreme happiness of mankind' (1755, vol. I, bk. I, pt. II), he held a
hierarchicalorder of several kinds of pleasures; his comparison of their quantity
assumed their qualitative distinctionswhich reflected his God-centred moral
orientation.In short, the highest pleasure is the pleasure of piety; second, of
social virtue; third, of beauty perceived by the internal sense; last, of body
perceived by the externalsenses.
In his moral philosophy God was almost replaced by his providential order,
that is,nature, so his aspiration to God did not bring a transcendental vision but
was integrated with his moral vision of ordinary life and ensured harmony of
self and public interests. His vision of ordinary life, however, was to be
superseded by his eschatological vision, which we find in the concluding pages
of his posthumous work, A System of Moral Philosophy. He predicted the end
of human history and the divine eternity. His general outlook of history
consisted in the progress of corruption and institutionaladjustment to it; a sort
of combination of civic humanism and social contract theory. Men moved from
the state of nature to civil society when 'simplicityof manners' gave way to
corruption and made 'civil polity' as opposed to 'tyranny' preferable to
'anarchy' (1755, II, 219). The countermeasure to corruption was not virtue or
the return to the firstprinciple of the ancient constitutionbut the elaboration of
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the constitutions which would prevent the evils from abusing politicalpower
(1755,11, 252). Increasing 'luxury and corruption' were matched by the
accumulation of 'wisdom and experience' necessary for perfection of 'civil
polity'.With this progressive outlook he refuted the ancient constitutionas the
irrelevantreturn to barbarity and recommended modern mixed constitution:
The argument of antiquity would recommend to us to return again to dens,
and caves, and beasts skins, and acorns, or wild fruitsof the earth,instead
of our present houses, food and cloathing. A rude artless plan might
succeed well in earlier days while more of the earlier simplicity and
innocence of manners was preserved. But, when luxury and corrption of
manners creptin, men would soon find the necessity of more artfulpolities.
(1755, II,258f)
Then he explained Harringtonian institutionssuch as the agrarianlaw, the
popular assembly and the senate and the rotationof offices.
Hutcheson's history was understood in terms of not the cycle of
constitutionsbut the linear progress. Within the institutionwent the progress of
ordinary life which corresponded to the providential order. He assumed that the
stable continuity of everyday life reflected the divine progress, so he was
criticalof historiography's tendency to neglect such continuity and underline
politicalcrises:
While historiesrelate wars, seditions, massacres, and the corruptions and
intrigues of courts,they are silentabout those vastly superior numbers who
in safe obscurity, are virtuously or innocently employed in the natural
business and enjoyments of mankind....The social joyful innocent
employments of the bulk of mankind are no subjects of history;nor even
the ordinary regular administration of a statein the protection of a people
and the execution of justice.(1755, I, 196)
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This changing emphasis in history seems to be parallelled with the
transformation of Hutcheson's moral vision we have seen. His apparent
exaltation of civic virtue belies his modern 'affirmation of ordinary life'.As
Strauss (1966, p. 83) notices, aristocraticvirtue of honour was supported by
history which recorded glorious actionsin wars and politics.A break with such
aristocraticmorality is what Strauss finds in Hobbes, and Locke also replaced
humanists' history glorifying martial virtue with education stressingcompassion
and preservation (Tully, 1988, p. 70). Hutcheson followed these English
philosophers breaking with aristocraticvirtue disdainfulof life.
Hutcheson's natural theology was incorporated into his moral vision of
civil life; the divine contrivance ensured that enlightened calm self-interests
would be compatible with public interests and that moral sentiments would
recommend virtue as internal happiness. The irreversibleprogress of corruption,
however, was doomed to lead us beyond this secular framework of providence.
We find Hutcheson's eschatology in the conclusion of his moral philosophy
rather baffling because it apparently makes what he pleaded for virtue
meaningless in the long run. He stressed 'the instable condition of terrestrial
affairs'and remarked that 'statesthemselves have within them the seeds of
death and destruction':opposition of interests and passions, 'the weakness and
inconstancy of human virtue'and 'luxury and present pleasures'(1755, II,377f).
What humans and statesattempted was significantonly to an extent limited by
this future eternal vision. It is not until the divine judgement that the
providential order would be fulfilledand virtue would be rewarded with restful
happiness. So it can be said that his system of moral philosophy, consisting of
natural theology, ethics,jurisprudence and politics,was ultimately subjected to
this vision of grace. Dualism of his moral philosophy and eschatology was
derived from Augustinian dualism of nature and grace in the Presbyterian
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tradition. Allan (1993) notices among Scottish historians since the reformation
'their national propensity for the grimly apocalyptic interpretation of history' (p.
31). But the fact that Hutcheson devoted only a few pages to eschatology in
his voluminous book shows clearly how far his concern deviated from that
tradition.
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